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Punitive damages are a long-standing, and frequently contro-versial part of the American civil justice system.1  For much
of their history punitive damages were awarded infrequently, but
there has been a “dramatic increase” in the incidence and size of
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1 See  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 25 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
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American law.  They have always been controversial.”).
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punitive damages verdicts in recent decades.2  As one commenta-
tor has noted, “hardly a month goes by without a multimillion-
dollar punitive damages verdict in a product liability case.”3  Pu-
nitive damages are being imposed so frequently, and in such
large amounts, that U.S. Supreme Court justices have expressed
concern that punitive damages in this country are “skyrocket-
ing”4 and have “run wild.”5  The gravity of the Court’s concern is
reflected in the attention that the Court has given to the issue.  In
a little over a decade, the Court has addressed punitive damages
issues in seven opinions.6
In the decision that goes to the core of this Article, in 1996 the
Court held in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore  that punitive
damages awards that are “grossly excessive” violate due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.7
The Gore  Court provided three “guideposts” for determining
whether punitive damages awards are unconstitutionally exces-
sive:  (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the
ratio between the actual damages and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the comparable civil and criminal sanctions for
the conduct.8  In an earlier law review article and amicus curiae
briefs to the Court, the authors of this Article suggested that pu-
nitive damages should be considered in light of criminal fines for
similar conduct.9
2 George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts to Understand It , in PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES, HOW JURIES DECIDE 1 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002).
3 Malcolm E. Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the
Use of Punitive Damages in Modern Products Liability Litigation , 40 ALA. L. REV.
919, 919 (1989).
4 Browning–Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282
(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 Haslip , 499 U.S. at 18.
6 See  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003); Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994);
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Haslip , 499 U.S. 1;
Browning-Ferris , 492 U.S. 257.
7 Gore , 517 U.S. at 563.
8 Id.  at 575.
9 See  Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform—State
Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by The Supreme Court of the
United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1365, 1380 n.90 (1993); Brief of Am. Auto.
Mfrs. Ass’n et al., as Amicus Curiae  in Support of Pet’r, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alli-
ance Res. Corp., No. 92-479, at 21; Brief of Am. Tort Reform Ass’n and Ass’n for
Cal. Tort Reform as Amicus Curiae  in Support of Pet’r, BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, No. 94-896, at 7-9.
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Unfortunately, lower courts have struggled in their attempts to
apply the Gore  criteria, particularly the third Gore  factor.10
Some courts have faithfully applied all three of the Court’s
guideposts, but many courts have selectively applied the criteria
in ways that run counter to the letter and spirit of the Court’s
jurisprudence.  In particular, many courts ignore, give “short
shrift” to, or misapply the third Gore  factor.11
This Article begins with a brief outline of the history of puni-
tive damages to put current trends in context.  Second, the Arti-
cle examines the Supreme Court’s recent punitive damages
opinions, and discusses how the Court’s decisions impose both
procedural and substantive limits on such awards.12  Third, the
Article looks at several courts that have ignored, discounted, or
otherwise failed to properly apply the third Gore  factor.  The Ar-
ticle compares these cases to decisions by other courts that have
faithfully applied the third Gore  factor.  Finally, the Article pro-
poses that courts reviewing a punitive damages verdict for a
claim of excessiveness should strive to properly consider and
weigh each of the factors articulated by the Gore Court, includ-
ing the third factor, which requires consideration of civil or crimi-
nal fines that are comparable to the conduct in question.
I
OVERVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The historical roots of punitive damages extend back to several
ancient legal systems which allowed punitive damages in specific
10 See  Brief of Gen. Dynamics Corp. as Amicus Curiae  in Support of Pet’r,
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., No. 99-2035, at 3-8 (explaining
how the “vast majority of appellate courts have ignored or misapplied [Gore’s] third
Guidepost) [hereinafter Brief of Gen. Dynamics Corp.]. See also  Mark A. Klugheit,
“Where the Rubber Meets the Road”:  Theoretical Justifications vs. Practical Out-
comes in Punitive Damages Litigation , 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 803, 834 (2002) (“The
Third BMW  factor—existing sanctions for comparable misconduct—seems to have
been honored by lower courts as much in the breach, as in the observance.”).
11 See  Brief of Gen. Dynamics Corp., supra  note 10, at 4 (reviewing reported
appellate decisions as of 2000).  In Cooper , the Court encouraged appellate courts to
use their particular expertise in applying the third Gore  factor. See Cooper , 532
U.S. at 440.  Since that decision, a few courts have faithfully applied the third Gore
factor. See infra  section IIIC.  Nevertheless, many courts continue to have problems
applying the third factor, as described in the Brief of Gen. Dynamics Corp. as Ami-
cus Curiae . See infra  section IIIB.
12 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW:  SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 17.10 (2002 Supp.).
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situations.13  The Anglo-American notion of punitive damages
can be traced to two eighteenth century English cases involving
illegal searches and seizures by officers of the Crown, Huckle v.
Money14 and Wilkes v. Wood .15  It was in these cases that the
English Courts first  recognized that punitive, or exemplary,
damages could be awarded apart from compensatory damages.16
After these decisions, English courts permitted punitive damages
to be imposed in other cases where one individual intentionally
caused harm to another, such as assault and battery, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, and trespass.17  The concept
soon made its way across the ocean, and punitive damages were
recognized by American courts in the late eighteenth century.18
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized punitive damages in
1852.19
The basis for and frequency of punitive damages awards in
America changed significantly beginning in the latter half of the
twentieth century.  Until the late 1900s, for instance, punitive
damages “merited scant attention,” because they “were rarely as-
sessed and likely to be small in amount.”20  Typically, punitive
damages awards only slightly exceeded compensatory damages
awards, if at all.21
Traditionally, courts imposed punitive damages on defendants
13 See  James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages:  A Relic That
Has Outlived Its Origins , 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (1984) (noting that forms of
punitive damages appeared in the Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C., and also ap-
peared in ancient Hittite law, the Hindu Code of Manu, and Mosaic law in the
Bible).
14 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763).
15 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
16 See  Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Dam-
ages , 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1982).
17 See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages “Run Wild”:  Pro-
posals for Punitive Damages Reform By Courts and Legislatures , 65 BROOK. L. REV.
1003, 1007 (1999).
18 See  Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards:  Reforming the Tort Reformers , 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1290-91
(1993).
19 See Haslip , 499 U.S. at 26 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Day v. Woodworth, 13
How. 363, 14 L. Ed. 181 (1852)).
20 Ellis, supra  note 16, at 2.
21 See , e.g. , S. Kan. Ry. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398 (1888) ($35 costs and fees, $10
injury to feelings, $71.75 punitive); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872) ($150 actual,
$331.67 exemplary); Woodman v. Town of Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387 (1870) ($578
actual, $100 exemplary); Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 N.H. 304 (1869) ($500
actual damages, $858.50 exemplary).
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that intentionally caused injury to the plaintiff.22  Beginning in
the 1960s, however, with the emergence of mass products liability
litigation, courts became more willing to impose punitive dam-
ages for less than intentional conduct.23  As a result, the 1970s
and 1980s saw a dramatic increase in the size of punitive damages
awards.24  Furthermore, “unprecedented numbers of punitive
awards in product liability and other mass tort situations began
to surface.”25
As a result of these trends, astronomical judgments that would
have been considered extreme even just a few years ago have
been handed down in several recent cases.  These include several
verdicts since 1998 exceeding $1 billion:
• In October of 2002, a Kansas City, Missouri jury awarded
$2.2 billion in punitive damages to a cancer patient whose
pharmacist diluted drugs to boost profits, even though most
of the pharmacist’s assets had already been seized.26
• In October of 1999, a Williamson County, Illinois trial court
entered a judgment of almost $1.18 billion (including $600
million in punitive damages) against State Farm Mutual Au-
tomobile Insurance Company in favor of a nationwide class
of State Farm policyholders.27  The case arose out of a long-
standing State Farm practice (shared by other automobile
insurers) of using non-Original Equipment Manufacturer
(OEM) parts to repair cars after accidents.  The practice
22 See  Schwartz et al., supra  note 17, at 1008-09.
23 See  Rustad & Koening, supra  note 18, at 1306-07 (acknowledging that the stan-
dard for imposing punitive damages has shifted from “malicious acts to highly negli-
gent ones” but disputing that punitive damages are awarded routinely).
24 See  Peter Kinzler, Recent Studies of Punitive Damage Awards:  The Tale of the
Tape , 15 J. INS. REG. 402, 404 (1997); George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enter-
prise Liability , 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 123 (1982). See also  Browning-Ferris Indus.
of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that a decade before the decision, “the
largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products lia-
bility case was $250,000.  Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been
sustained on appeal.”); Schwartz et al., supra  note 17, at 1009.
25 John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Dam-
ages , 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986); see also  Philip Borowsky & Lee Nicolaisen,
Punitive Damages in California:  The Integrity of Jury Verdicts , 17 U.S.F. L. REV.
147, 148 (1983) (noting the trend of “juries . . . award[ing] substantial punitive dam-
ages with increasing frequency”).
26 See What’s News , WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at A1.  The award was reduced by
the trial court to $330 million. See Missouri Award Against Pharmacist Reduced ,
LIAB. & INS. WEEK., Feb. 24, 2003, at 5.
27 See  Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2001) (finding that $130 million in disgorgement damages was duplicative of the
specification damage award, but affirming the trial court judgment in all other
respects).
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had been fully disclosed to policyholders.  State Farm and
other insurance companies followed this practice to create
and assure a competitive market with OEM parts and to re-
duce repair costs.28
• In July of 1999, a Los Angeles, California court ordered
General Motors Corp. to pay $4.9 billion to six people who
were injured when their vehicle was rear-ended by a speed-
ing drunk driver and caught on fire.  The trial judge later
reduced the award to $1.2 billion.  The case was settled in
2003 for an undisclosed amount.29
II
RECENT SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence since the late 1980s dem-
onstrates the Court’s concern that punitive damages awards
should not be assessed without constraints on jury discretion.
Beginning with the Court’s 1989 decision in Browning-Ferris In-
dustries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.  (discussed infra)
through the Court’s most recent pronouncement in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell  (also discussed in-
fra), the Court has attempted to ensure that punitive damages
are not awarded arbitrarily and capriciously.  In doing so, the
Court has invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Although the concepts have not always been
clearly delineated in the Court’s opinions,30 the Court has held
that a defendant has a right to both procedural and substantive
due process protections when punitive damages are assessed.
The lack of a clear distinction between substantive and procedu-
ral due process protections may be one of the reasons that lower
courts have not consistently applied the “guideposts” articulated
by the Supreme Court in Gore  (discussed infra).
In this section, we will review the Court’s recent punitive dam-
28 See generally  Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, State Farm v. Avery:  State
Court Regulation Through Litigation Has Gone Too Far , 33 CONN. L. REV. 1215
(2001).
29 See  Margaret Cronin Fisk, The Biggest Verdict of 1999 , NAT’L L. J., Feb. 28,
2000, at A1 (discussing Anderson v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. BC 116, 926 (Super.
Ct., Los Angeles, Cal. 1999)); Frederic M. Biddle, GM Verdict Cut $3.8 Billion in
Suit Over Explosion , WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1999, at B5; GM to Settle Case Over Gas
Tank Explosion , L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at B4.
30 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra  note 12 at § 14.6(e) (explaining the difference
between the procedural and substantive due process issues that are raised in the
Court’s decisions).
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ages cases with a focus on substantive and procedural due pro-
cess to clarify that both concepts are present in the Court’s
decisions.  As we will show, confusion arises in applying the Gore
factors as a result of a preoccupation with the procedural due
process issue of “notice,” when courts analyze the substantive is-
sue of whether a punitive damages award is “grossly excessive.”
1. Browning-Ferris
In Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc., v. Kelco Dispo-
sal, Inc. ,31 the Supreme Court first opened the door to the argu-
ment that the Fourteenth Amendment places limits on punitive
damages awards.32  The issue before the Court was whether the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to pu-
nitive damages.33  The Court found that punitive damages in pri-
vate civil actions are “too far afield from the concerns that
animate the Eighth Amendment,” and therefore held that the
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damages.34
The defendant also asked the Court to review whether the award
was excessive under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.35  The Court declined to address the issue, how-
ever, since it had not been raised before either the district court
or the court of appeals below.36  Nevertheless, in dicta, the Court
invited defendants to bring the issue before the Court again, not-
ing that “[t]here is some authority in [the Court’s] opinions for
the view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the
size of a civil damages award,” but “[t]hat inquiry must await an-
other day.”37
2. Haslip
Two years later, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Has-
lip ,38 the Court for the first time acknowledged that excessive
punitive damages awards could violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, although the Court held that the award in that case did not
31 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
32 Id.  at 276-77.
33 Id.  at 259.
34 Id.  at 275.
35 Id.  at 276.
36 Id.  at 275.
37 Id.  at 276-77.
38 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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violate due process.39  The defendant asserted that the punitive
damages award of $840,000 (more than four times the $200,000
compensatory damages award in the case)40 was “the product of
unbridled jury discretion and . . . violative of [the defendant’s]
due process rights.”41  The Court granted certiorari to “review
the punitive damages procedures  and award in light of the long-
enduring debate about their propriety.”42  The Court determined
that the punitive damages award did not violate due process be-
cause the instructions given to the jury, the post-trial review pro-
cedures, and the appellate review procedures imposed “a
sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion
[of the jury to award] punitive damages.”43
Although the Court in Haslip  recognized that the punitive
damages imposed in the case greatly exceeded the comparable
civil fine,44 the Court’s decision focused upon the procedures
used to impose and review punitive damages awards.  The Court
did not focus upon the question of whether a verdict can be so
large as to violate due process, even if there are sufficient proce-
dural protections.  In Haslip , the Court was satisfied that due
process was satisfied because the defendant “had the benefit of
the full panoply of Alabama’s procedural protections.”45
In a dissent that foreshadowed the Court’s later jurisprudence,
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor criticized the trial court in Haslip
for failing to provide sufficient guidance to the jury.  Justice
O’Connor said that the instructions did not suggest:
what relation, if any, should exist between the harm caused
and the size of the award, nor how to measure the deterrent
effect of a particular award.  It provided no information to the
jury about criminal fines for comparable conduct and the
range of punitive damages awards in similar cases.46
39 Id.  at 18-19.
40 See id . at 6 n.2.  The Court noted that “[a]lthough there is controversy about
the matter, it is probable that the general verdict for respondent Haslip contained a
punitive damages component of not less than $840,000.”
41 Id.  at 7.
42 Id.  (emphasis added).
43 Id.  at 20, 22.
44 See id.  at 23.  Specifically, the Court noted that the punitive damages award in
Haslip , which was an insurance fraud case, was “much in excess of the fine that
could be imposed for insurance fraud” under the relevant sections of the Alabama
code. Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.  at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice O’Connor also noted that the issues raised in Haslip
were distinct from substantive due process concerns.47  She
stated that judicial review of a punitive damages award tests
whether the award is “grossly excessive,” noting “this is an im-
portant substantive due process concern, but our focus here is on
the requirements of procedural due process.”48
3. TXO
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. ,49 a plu-
rality of the Supreme Court finally held that “the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits
‘beyond which penalties may not go.’”50  The parties in TXO
urged the Court to adopt a bright-line test for determining
whether an award is “grossly excessive.”51  The Court rejected
the approaches advanced by both parties, and concluded that the
award was not “grossly excessive.”52  Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which they noted
that they declined to join the majority opinion because “it makes
explicit what was implicit in Haslip :  the existence of a so-called
‘substantive due process’ right that punitive damages be reasona-
ble.”53  Thus, after TXO , a substantive right to reasonable puni-
tive damages awards had been recognized, but the standard for
determining whether that right had been violated had not yet
been clearly articulated.54
In a dissenting opinion in TXO , Justice O’Connor, joined by
Justices Byron White and David Souter, noted that the Court’s
decision provided “not a single guidepost to help other courts
find their way through this area.”55  The dissenting justices sug-
gested that the Court should consider adopting objective factors
by which to judge whether punitive damages awards are uncon-
stitutionally excessive.56
47 Id.  at 44.
48 Id.  at 55-56.
49 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
50 Id.  at 454.
51 Id . at 455-56.
52 Id . at 462.
53 Id.  at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra  note 12, at § 14.6(e) (noting that TXO  estab-
lished that the Court was ready to recognize both procedural and substantive due
process rights in punitive damages cases).
55 TXO , 509 U.S. at 480 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
56 See id .
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4. Honda Motor Co.
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg ,57 the Supreme Court departed
from substantive due process questions to consider the procedu-
ral issue of whether a state must provide judicial review of the
amount of a punitive damages award.58  The Court held that
states must allow for judicial review of the size of punitive dam-
ages awards, and Oregon’s failure to do so violated due pro-
cess.59  In Honda Motor , the Court noted that “our recent cases
have recognized that the Constitution imposes a substantive limit
on the size of punitive damages awards.”60  Although the Court’s
decision centered on procedural issues, the Court took an oppor-
tunity to reiterate the point that punitive damages awards that
are so large as to be “grossly excessive” are unconstitutional.61
5. Gore
The Supreme Court returned to substantive due process con-
siderations in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore .62  The
Court granted certiorari in Gore  to “help . . . illuminate ‘the
character of the standard that will identify unconstitutionally ex-
cessive awards.’”63 Gore  involved a claim by an Alabama doctor
alleging that BMW, the auto manufacturer, committed fraud by
failing to disclose minor cosmetic repairs to cars sold as new.64
In Dr. Gore’s case, the flawed “paint job” on his new BMW se-
dan was so minor that he never noticed it.65  The repair was
brought to his attention months later when he took the car to a
“detailer”—someone who would thoroughly clean the car inside
and out to make it look “snazzier than it normally would ap-
pear.”66  The detailer noted that portions of Dr. Gore’s car had
been repainted and brought this to the doctor’s attention.67  Dr.
Gore sued the American distributor of BMW automobiles seek-
ing both compensatory and punitive damages on the theory that
BMW’s failure to disclose the repainting constituted “gross, op-
57 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
58 Id.  at 420.
59 Id . at 432.
60 Id . at 420.
61 See id.
62 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
63 Id.  at 568.
64 Id.  at 563.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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pressive or malicious” fraud under Alabama law.68
At trial, BMW acknowledged that it had a national policy of
repairing cars that were damaged in the course of manufacture or
during shipment.69  If the cost of a repair exceeded three percent
of the car’s suggested retail price, it was placed in company ser-
vice for a period of time and then sold as used.  If the repair was
less than three percent of the purchase price, however, BMW
sold the car as “new” without advising the dealer or the customer
that any repairs had been made.70
Because the cost of repainting Dr. Gore’s car was only about
one and a half percent of his car’s suggested retail price, BMW
did not disclose its repair to the Alabama dealer or to Dr.
Gore.71  BMW’s nondisclosure policy was consistent with the
statutory laws of approximately twenty-five states which define
disclosure obligations of automobile manufacturers, distributors,
and retailers.72  Under these state laws, BMW’s failure to dis-
close minor refinishing was lawful.
Nevertheless, an Alabama jury awarded Dr. Gore $4,000 as
compensatory damages for the difference in the value of the car
he “bargained for” and the car he received.73  The jury also
awarded $4 million in punitive damages, which it apparently cal-
culated by multiplying Dr. Gore’s damage estimate ($4,000) by
1,000, the number of cars BMW allegedly sold throughout the
country under its nondisclosure policy.74
On appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court, BMW contended,
among other things, that its out-of-state conduct was permissible
under the disclosure statutes of other states and, therefore, could
not serve as a basis for a punitive damages award.75  The Ala-
bama Supreme Court agreed, holding that the jury should not
have been permitted to consider sales by BMW outside of Ala-
bama.76  Having found the verdict tainted, the court reduced the
punitive damages award to $2 million, believing that this amount
was “a constitutionally reasonable” punishment for BMW’s con-
68 Id.  at 565.
69 Id.  at 563.
70 Id.  at 563-64.
71 Id.  at 564.
72 Id.  at 565.
73 Id.
74 Id.  at 567.
75 Id.  at 565.
76 Id . at 567.
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duct in Alabama.77
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Alabama Supreme
Court’s decision, holding that the reduced punitive damages
award was still “grossly excessive” in violation of due process.78
In determining that the award was unconstitutionally excessive,
the Court used terminology that describes both substantive and
procedural due process concerns with respect to punitive dam-
ages awards.79  For example, the Court began its opinion by not-
ing that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ‘grossly excessive’
punishment on a tortfeasor.”80  Then, just before articulating the
three guideposts that led the Court to determine that the award
was unconstitutionally excessive, the Court stated that
“[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of
the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also of the
severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”81  The Court’s
reference to the defendant’s “notice” of the severity of the pen-
alty has led many lower courts to conclude that a punitive dam-
ages award is not unconstitutional if the defendant had notice of
the size of the award that could be imposed.82  Yet, the Court
held in Gore  that the award against BMW was “grossly exces-
sive,” which is a substantive due process concern.  The Gore
court recognized, as it had in TXO , that there are “substantive
limits ‘beyond which penalties may not go.’”83
The Gore  Court offered three “guideposts” for determining
whether a punitive damages award is “unconstitutionally exces-
sive.”  Those factors are:  the “degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s conduct;”84 the ratio of actual damages to punitive
damages;85 and a comparison to “civil or criminal penalties that
could be imposed for comparable misconduct.”86
77 Id.
78 Id.  at 574.
79 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra  note 12, at § 14.6(e) (stating “Justice Stevens’
majority opinion in Gore , at certain points, seems to mix procedural due process and
substantive due process issues”).
80 Gore , 517 U.S. at 562.
81 Id.  at 574.
82 Id.  at 561.
83 Id.  at 568; see also TXO , 509 U.S. at 454.
84 Gore , 517 U.S. at 575.
85 See id.  at 580.
86 Id.  at 583.
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6. Cooper Industries
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. ,87
the Court affirmed that the Due Process Clause places substan-
tive limits on punitive damages awards, and provided lower
courts with additional guidance for reviewing such awards for ex-
cessiveness.88  The Court held that appellate courts must engage
in a de novo review of punitive damages awards to determine if
an award is unconstitutionally excessive.89  In addition, the Court
stated in dicta that in Gore  it had “instructed courts evaluating a
punitive damages [award] . . . to consider three criteria.”90  This
statement directs courts to consider all three Gore  factors when
reviewing a punitive damages award for excessiveness.  In
Cooper , the Court did not say that it had merely proposed or
suggested three factors to be applied by lower courts determining
the excessiveness of a punitive damages award.  Rather, the
Court clearly stated that it had instructed  courts to consider all
three of the Gore  factors.  Moreover, the Court specifically
noted that the third Gore  factor is “more suited to the expertise
of appellate courts.”91
7. State Farm
The U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent opinion in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell92 is a significant
addition to the Court’s recent line of punitive damages decisions.
The Court’s six-to-three ruling clarified the guideposts set forth
in Gore  and also laid down new standards for courts to follow.
State Farm  stemmed from an automobile accident in Utah.
Curtis Campbell, driving north on a highway, passed six vehicles
and barely avoided a collision by veering back into his lane just
before he would have smashed into an oncoming car.93  The
driver of the oncoming car swerved into the shoulder, lost con-
trol, and collided with a third vehicle, leaving one driver dead
87 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
88 Id.  at 433 (“Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the
imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits
on that discretion.”).
89 Id.
90 Id.  at 440.
91 Id.
92 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
93 Id . at 1517.
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and the other permanently disabled.94  Campbell’s insurer, State
Farm, contested liability and declined to settle the claims against
Campbell for his $50,000 policy limit ($25,000 per claimant).95  A
jury then returned a verdict against Campbell for three times the
policy limit, finding him to have been 100% at fault for the acci-
dent.96  State Farm later agreed to pay the entire judgment, in-
cluding the amounts in excess of Campbell’s policy limit.97
Campbell and his wife nonetheless sued State Farm for bad faith,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on
State Farm’s initial refusal to settle the auto accident case.98  Evi-
dence was introduced at trial that pertained to State Farm’s busi-
ness practices in numerous states, but bore no relation to the
types of claims alleged in the Campbells’ complaint.99  The jury
awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages
and $145 million in punitive damages, which the trial court re-
duced to $1 million and $25 million, respectively.100  On appeal,
the Utah Supreme Court reinstated the entire $145 million puni-
tive damages award, taking into account such factors as State
Farm’s net worth and aspects of its behavior in other states.101
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the award “was
neither reasonable nor proportionate to the wrong committed,
and it was an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property
of the defendant.”102
The Court began its opinion by discussing the various factors it
laid out in Gore  for determining when punitive damages awards
are unconstitutionally excessive.  The Court proceeded to pro-
vide important clarification with respect to the Gore  guide-
posts—essentially putting “meat” on the due process “bones”
outline in Gore .
First, the Court reminded lower courts that the “most impor-
tant indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award
is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”103
94 Id .
95 Id . at 1518.
96 Id .
97 Id .
98 Id .
99 See id .
100 Id . at 1519.
101 Id .
102 Id . at 1521.
103 Id . at 1522 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559, 572
(1996)).
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The Court made clear that it is unconstitutional to consider out-
of-state conduct that was legal in the state where it was con-
ducted.104  The Court indicated that juries must be instructed that
they “may not use evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a
defendant for action that was lawful in the jurisdiction where it
occurred.”105  “Nor as a general rule,” the Court added, “does
the State have a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages
to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the
State’s jurisdiction.”106  “A basic principle of federalism is that
each State may make its own judgment about what conduct is
permitted or proscribed within its borders, and each State alone
can determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on
a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.”107
The Court also stated that punitive damages may not be calcu-
lated based upon the hypothetical claims of other claimants be-
cause “[p]unishment on these bases creates the possibility of
multiple punitive damage awards for the same conduct; for in the
usual case nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other
plaintiff obtains.”108  Finally, with respect to reprehensibility, the
Court noted that this “guidepost does not permit courts to ex-
pand the scope of the case so that a defendant may be punished
for any malfeasance, which in this case extended for a 20-year
period.”109
The State Farm  Court went on to provide important, additional
clarification regarding the second Gore guidepost:  the ratio be-
tween compensatory and punitive damages awards.  The Court
declined once again to create a “bright-line ratio which a punitive
damages award cannot exceed,” but indicated that “few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensa-
tory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”110
The Court noted that in exceptional cases a higher ratio may be
justified where “a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a
104 Id . (“A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been law-
ful where it occurred.”).
105 Id . at 1522-23.
106 Id . at 1522.  The Court explained that “[l]awful out-of-state conduct may be
probative when it demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s
action in the State where it is tortuous,” but warned “that conduct must have a
nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff.” Id.
107 Id . at 1523.
108 Id . (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 593 (1996)).
109 Id . at 1524.
110 Id .
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small amount of economic damages.”111  The Court, however,
observed that “[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial,
then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages,
can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”112
Finally, with respect to the ratio guidepost, the Court reminded
lower courts that the “wealth of the defendant cannot justify an
otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages award.”113
Having decided that the punitive damages award in State Farm
violated the first two guideposts set forth in Gore , the Court con-
cluded that it was not necessary to “dwell long” on the third
Gore  factor—the disparity between the punitive damages award
and the civil or criminal penalties imposed in comparable
cases.114  The Court did suggest, however, that application of this
factor reinforced its decision to find the $145 million punitive
damages award unconstitutionally excessive.  The Court ex-
plained:  “The most relevant civil sanction under Utah state law
for the wrong done to the Campbells appears to be a $10,000 fine
for an act of fraud, an amount dwarfed by the $145 million puni-
tive damages award.”115
III
APPLYING THE THIRD GORE FACTOR:  MOST
COURTS HAVE DISTORTED THE SUPREME
COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS, BUT A
FEW HAVE GOTTEN IT RIGHT
A. Lower Courts Have Failed to Follow The Spirit of the
Court’s Overall Guidance
Taken together, the Supreme Court’s recent punitive damages
opinions reflect a clear desire by the Court to reduce arbitrari-
ness and excessiveness in punitive damages awards.  First, the
fact that the Court has addressed constitutional limits on punitive
111 Id .  The authors have posed a hypothetical where somebody throws harmful
acid at another person intending serious physical injury, but causes only minimal
damage to that person’s clothing.  In such a case, punitive damages substantially
exceeding actual damages may be justified. See  Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform—State Legislatures Can And Should Meet The
Challenge Issued By The Supreme Court Of The United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 1365, 1379 n.86 (1993).
112 State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1525.
113 Id . at 1525.
114 Id . at 1526 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)).
115 Id . at 1526 (internal citations omitted).
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damages repeatedly since 1989 indicates that the Court views the
problem of punitive damages “run wild” as a serious one.116  The
Court is not likely to issue a “bright line,” easily applicable rule
in punitive damages cases, but one of the clear themes that has
emerged from the Court’s holdings is that punitive damages
awards should be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.
There is little doubt that in Gore  and State Farm  the Court
sought to provide standards for courts to use in reviewing puni-
tive damages for excessiveness.  The Gore  Court stated that it
accepted the case because it believed that “review of [the] case
would help illuminate ‘the character of the standard that will
identify unconstitutionally excessive awards’ of punitive dam-
ages.”117  As Justice O’Connor had previously stated in her dis-
sent in Haslip , “vague reference to ‘the character and the degree
of the wrong’ and the ‘necessity of preventing a similar wrong’ do
not assist a jury in making a reasoned decision.”118  In order to
make punitive damage awards more than just an arbitrary assign-
ment of damages based upon the jurors’ “feelings” in a case, ap-
pellate courts must take seriously and apply all  three guideposts
articulated by the court in Gore  and explained further in State
Farm .
Taken individually, however, the various statements that have
been made by the Supreme Court in its punitive damages deci-
sions could be used to support a variety of outcomes on appellate
review.  For example, in Haslip , the Court stated that it could not
“draw a mathematical bright line between the constitutionally ac-
ceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit
every case.”119  Nevertheless, the Court noted that the punitive
damages award in that case, which was four times the amount of
compensatory damages, was close to the line of constitutional im-
propriety.120  In Gore , the Court stated that the punitive dam-
ages award, which was 500 times the compensatory damages
awarded, “raise[d] a suspicious judicial eyebrow.”121  Thus, al-
though the Court’s statement in Haslip could be seen as raising a
red flag when the ratio between punitive and compensatory dam-
ages is higher than four to one, some lower courts have relied
116 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
117 Gore , 517 U.S. at 568.
118 Haslip , 499 U.S. at 48  (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
119 Id.  at 18.
120 Id.  at 23-24.
121 Gore , 517 U.S. at 583.
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upon Gore  to uphold awards with a large ratio by claiming that
the punitive damages award in question was far below the 500-to-
1 ratio deemed unconstitutionally excessive in Gore .122  The
Gore  and State Farm  standards provide instructive assistance to
lower courts while retaining enough flexibility to accommodate
the facts of a particular case.  Unfortunately, some courts have
taken advantage of the flexibility of the Gore  guideposts and
have bent them beyond recognition.123
The third Gore  factor, which looks at the comparable civil or
criminal penalties that could be assessed for conduct similar to
the conduct at issue in the case, has received too little attention
from the judiciary (including from the Supreme Court in State
Farm).  This factor is significant in that it is the only one of the
Gore  Court’s three criteria that ties the punitive damages verdict
to broader policy judgments made by “society,” as expressed
through the legislature, as to what the appropriate punishment
for the behavior at issue should be.  The comparable civil or
criminal penalty is not an absolute limit on the size of the puni-
tive damages award, but it should be used as a guidepost to de-
termine if the size of the punitive damages award is “grossly
excessive.”
B. Courts That Have Failed to Follow the Letter of the
Gore Guideposts
Lower courts have had particular difficulty applying the third
Gore  factor.  One reason may be that factors one and two en-
compass concepts that are easy to understand and apply without
going beyond the facts of the case.  The Supreme Court declared
the first factor, reprehensibility, “perhaps the most impor-
tant.”124  Reviewing courts can conceptualize that the level of
punishment should reflect how “bad” the conduct was, and how
much damage was caused.  The second factor, the ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages, is a seemingly objective fac-
122 See , e.g. , Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473 (Or. 2001) (upholding a
punitive damages award eighty-seven times the compensatory damages award); Par-
acelsus Health Care Corp. v. Willard, 754 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 2000) (holding that an
award in which punitive damages were 150 times the actual damages awarded was
not unconstitutionally excessive).  The U.S. Supreme Court’s State Farm  opinion
may curb the problem of lower courts finding creative ways to justify such large
ratios.  As the Court explained, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio . . . will
satisfy due process.” State Farm , 123 S. Ct. at 1516.
123 See  sources cited supra  note 11. See also  discussion infra  section III.B.
124 Gore , 517 U.S. at 575.
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tor.  By way of contrast, the third factor requires courts to go
beyond the particular facts of the case in considering whether an
award is excessive.  Factor three requires a comparison of the
jury’s award to legislative determinations regarding appropriate
sanctions for the behavior in question.
1. Disregarding Factor Three
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has called on appellate
courts to use their “expertise” in applying the third Gore  fac-
tor,125 lower courts have struggled in applying it.126  Many appel-
late courts have disregarded and misunderstood the third
guidepost.127  These courts have failed to uphold the letter of the
law.  For example, in the very same case in which the Supreme
Court set forth the Gore  guideposts, on remand the Alabama
Supreme Court declared the comparable statutory fines too low
to merit consideration.128  On remand in Gore , the Alabama Su-
preme Court reconsidered the punitive damages verdict against
BMW in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in that
case.129  The Alabama Supreme Court considered the first two
factors given by the U.S. Supreme Court, and found that the rep-
rehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and the large ratio be-
tween compensatory and punitive damages indicated that the
award was excessive.130  Turning to the third factor, however, the
Alabama Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had
instructed it to accord “substantial deference” to legislative judg-
ments regarding the appropriate penalty in similar cases, and
then proceeded to completely disregard the Court’s direction.131
The Alabama Supreme Court stated that the maximum civil pen-
alty under Alabama law would be $2,000, and then declared that
because the statutory penalty was set “at such a low level, there is
125 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001).
126 See  Brief of Gen. Dynamics Corp., supra , note 10.
127 See , e.g. , Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2000)
(discussing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and the ratio between
compensatory damages and punitive, but not making any reference to the third
Gore  factor); Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997) (analyzing the first and
second Gore  factors, but making no mention of factor three); Wal-mart Inc., v.
Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, 182 (Ala. 2000) (stating that the court had “no basis for
considering [the third Gore] factor relevant”).
128 BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 514 (Ala. 1997).
129 Id.  at 508.
130 Id.  at 512-13.
131 Id.  at 514.
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little basis for comparing it with any meaningful punitive dam-
ages award.”132  The Alabama Supreme Court’s analysis bla-
tantly defied the U.S. Supreme Court’s instruction.  The U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that appellate courts should give legis-
lative judgments “substantial deference,” but the Alabama Su-
preme Court gave its legislature no deference at all.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals also disregarded a statutory
fine that it considered too low in Brantner Farms Inc. v. Gar-
ner ,133 a land dispute involving a neighbor who planted grass
seed on a tract of land that he erroneously believed belonged to
him.134  The jury awarded the plaintiff $819 in compensatory
damages and $50,000 in punitive damages.135  The defendant ap-
pealed, asserting that the punitive damages award was “grossly
excessive.”136  The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the
award was not “grossly excessive” in light of the Gore  stan-
dards.137  In analyzing the third Gore  factor, the court acknowl-
edged that the criminal statute provided a comparable
sanction,138 but the court then essentially disregarded the availa-
ble sanction of $1,000, noting that it is “not sufficient to deter
appellants’ behavior in the future.”139
Some courts have failed to even perform a cursory factor three
analysis.140  For example, in Williams v. Aetna Finance Co .,141 a
consumer fraud case in which the plaintiff was awarded $15,000
in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages,
the Supreme Court of Ohio cryptically stated that “it would ap-
pear that when one of the guideposts is particularly relevant a
lesser reliance on the other guideposts may be justified.”142  The
Mississippi Supreme Court was similarly dismissive in Paracelsus
132 Id . at 514.  The Alabama Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in other cases
as well.  For example, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Robbins ,  719 So. 2d 245, 247 (Ala.
1998), the court again found that the statutory penalty for misfilling a prescription
was too low to merit comparison to the punitive damages awarded in that case.
133 No. C6-01-1572, 2002 WL 1163559 (Minn. App. Jun. 4, 2002), review denied
(Minn. Aug. 20, 2002).
134 Id . at *1.
135 Id .
136 Id.  at *5.
137 Id.  at *7.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See  Brief of Gen. Dynamics Corp., supra , note 10 (collecting cases in which
courts conducted a Gore  analysis without mentioning the third factor).
141 700 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1998).
142 Id.  at 871.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 21 11-NOV-03 9:07
Selective Due Process 53
Health Care Corp. v. Willard ,143 a case in which the plaintiffs as-
serted breach of employment contract and retaliatory discharge
for reporting forged checks.144  The two plaintiffs were awarded
$10,000 and $35,102 respectively, and each plaintiff was awarded
$1.5 million in punitive damages.145  The Supreme Court of Mis-
sissippi summarily concluded that “there are no other sanctions
which could be imposed under the facts of this case.”146  Con-
trary to the statements by these state courts, the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court has named this factor as a “guidepost” is a suffi-
cient reason for any court reviewing whether a punitive damages
award is unconstitutionally excessive to consider this factor rele-
vant.  The Court’s statement in Cooper  that lower courts are “in-
structed” to consider the three Gore  factors affirms the Court’s
intention that reviewing courts consider each of the three Gore
criteria.147
A low statutory sanction or the lack of a criminal or civil fine
should not be presumed to be the result of mistake or oversight
on the part of the legislature; a statutory penalty is the result of
the legislative process.  A small civil or criminal penalty, or the
absence of a penalty does not indicate that there is no basis for
comparison.148  Rather, a low or nonexistent penalty reflects a
policy judgment that the conduct at issue in the case is not con-
sidered by the legislature to be so serious as to merit substantial
punishment.  This fact was recognized by the United States Dis-
trict Court for Washington State in Groom v. Safeway, Inc.149  In
Groom , the district court considered a punitive damages award
against a store in a case brought by a shopper who was unreason-
ably detained by a security guard employed by the store.150  The
jury awarded the plaintiff $5,000 in compensatory damages and
$750,000 in punitive damages.151  After considering the reprehen-
sibility of the defendant’s conduct and the ratio between the pu-
143 754 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1999).
144 Id.  at 439.
145 Id.  at 440.
146 Id.  at 445.
147 See  Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440
(2001) (noting that in Gore  the Court had “instructed courts evaluating a punitive
damages award’s consistency with due process to consider three criteria.”).
148 See  George Clemon Freeman, Jr., Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Dam-
ages and Other Monetary Punishments , 57 BUS. LAW. 587, 614 (2002).
149 973 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Wash. 1997).
150 Id.  at 989.
151 Id.
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nitive damages and compensatory damages awards, the court
considered the third Gore  factor and noted that “the fact that
apparently there is no law imposing civil or criminal penalties for
comparable conduct strongly suggests that an enormous punitive
damage award is not warranted here.”152
2. Using Jury Verdicts Rather Than Statutory Penalties as the
Basis for Comparison
Other courts, in an apparent attempt to apply the third Gore
factor, have compared the punitive damages award with jury ver-
dicts in civil cases, rather than with civil penalties.153  For exam-
ple, in Wightman v. Consolidated Rail Corp .,154 an Ohio
wrongful death case arising from  a collision between a freight
train and an automobile, the plaintiff was awarded $1 million in
compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.155
The state trial court judge reduced the punitive damages award
to $15 million.156  In reviewing the defendant’s claim that the re-
duced award was still excessive and unconstitutional, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio asserted that the “relevant civil penalty”
for comparison was the potential award which could be handed
down in a civil lawsuit.157  This is not the best application of the
third Gore  factor for two reasons.  First, as discussed above, the
third factor compares the jury’s judgment in the case with the
legislature’s judgment about the appropriate sanctions for the
conduct at issue.158  Comparing a punitive damages award to
other jury verdicts divorces this factor from its connection to the
legislature’s policy judgments.  Second, unlike statutory penal-
ties, which are prospectively enacted to cover a broad range of
situations, jury verdicts are retroactive judgments based upon
specific factual situations.  Because jury verdicts are dependent
152 Id.  at 995.
153 See  St. John v. Coisman, 799 So. 2d 1110, 1114 (Fla. App. 2001) (“Stated an-
other way the third criterion is to consider whether the defendant’s conduct was
sufficiently egregious to merit the amount of punitive damages in light of other
awards in similar cases.”); see also  Brief of Gen. Dynamics Corp., supra  note 10.
154 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999).
155 Id.  at 549-50.
156 Id . at 550.
157 Id.  at 555.
158 See  Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cogni-
tion and Valuation in Law) , 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2090 (1998) (stating that the third
Gore  factor “serves as a means of checking jury determination against assessments
of democratically elected legislatures”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\82-1\ORE102.txt unknown Seq: 23 11-NOV-03 9:07
Selective Due Process 55
on the specific facts in a case, they are less appropriate for com-
parison than statutory penalties, which are intended to apply to a
broad range of situations.
3. Misreading Factor Three as a Mere “Notice” Requirement
Other courts have interpreted the third Gore  factor as simply
requiring defendants to have fair “notice” of potentially large pu-
nitive damages awards, rather than as a way in which to measure
whether the award is “grossly excessive.”159  For example, in a
recent product liability action against an automobile manufac-
turer in which the jury awarded $235,000 in compensatory dam-
ages and $3 million in punitive damages, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals offered the following as its entire analysis of the third
Gore  factor:  “it can be said that automobile manufacturers are
generally on notice that their reckless conduct resulting in death
could trigger a substantial punitive damages award.”160  This
statement appears to mean that, at least in the Sixth Circuit, the
third Gore  factor may be presumed to support large punitive
damages awards against auto manufacturers because they are
“generally on notice” that large punitive damages awards are
possible.  The ultimate result of this type of reasoning would be
that extreme punitive damages awards may be used to support
excessive punitive damages awards in the future.161
It is unlikely that this is the result the U.S. Supreme Court in-
tended in Gore  when it instructed lower courts to compare puni-
tive damages awards with potentially available civil sanctions,
particularly given the Court’s concern that punitive damages
have “run wild.”162  Although the Supreme Court did make ref-
erence in Gore  to whether BMW had “notice of the severity of
159 For example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that while statutes
and regulations should be the focus of a factor three analysis, “a reviewing court
should search for comparisons solely to determine whether a particular defendant
was given fair notice as to its potential liability for particular misconduct, not to
determine the acceptable range into which an award might fall.”  Zimmerman v.
Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 83 (1st Cir. 2001).  Similarly, in Continental
Trend Res., Inc. v. Oxy USA, Inc. , 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the “fundamental question” in a factor three
analysis is whether a defendant has “reasonable notice” that its conduct “could re-
sult in such a large punitive award.”
160 Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 310 F.3d 461, 482 (6th Cir. 2002).
161 See , e.g. , Wightman v. Consol. Rail Corp., 715 N.E.2d 546, 555 (Ohio 1999)
(holding that because verdicts in excess of a million dollars could result from rail-
road accidents resulting in severe injuries, the defendant “could see this coming”).
162 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
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the punishment to be imposed,” notice alone does not make a
punitive damages award constitutionally valid.163  Notice is a
concept associated with procedural due process.164  The issue at
the heart of Gore  was substantive due process, that is, there are
some limits on the amount of a punitive damages award “beyond
which penalties may not go.”165  Therefore, as with factors one
and two, what courts are really after is a determination of
whether the award is so large as to be “grossly excessive.”166
Comparing a punitive damages award to the comparable civil
and criminal fines provides one yardstick by which to measure
whether an award is grossly excessive.  In contrast, reading the
third Gore  factor as merely a notice requirement does little to
further the analysis of the whether the size of the award is so
large as to be unconstitutionally excessive.
The distinction between the requirement that a citizen have
notice of a potential penalty, and the prohibition on grossly ex-
cessive penalties, can perhaps be more clearly illustrated with the
following example.  Imagine that a state passed a new law impos-
ing a $10,000 fine on anyone caught driving more than ten miles
per hour in excess of the speed limit, but did not inform drivers
of this change.167  If a driver were pulled over the next day and
fined in accordance with the statute, the driver might argue that
his or her due process rights were violated because there was no
way that he or she could have known of the substantial penalty
that might be imposed under the new law.  The driver might also
argue that $10,000 is a grossly excessive fine for a minor speeding
163 See  Michael J. Philips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court , 75 DENV. U.
L. REV. 453, 471 n.110 (1998) (noting that the Gore  “criteria appear to be substan-
tive”  and “[e]ven if the state had given BMW all the notice in the world . . . it still
might have violated due process under these criteria”).
164 See  TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 465 (1993).  In
TXO , the Court distinguished between substantive and procedural due process.
TXO’s argument that the punitive damages award was unfair because it did not have
notice of the possible size of the punitive damages award is discussed in Part IV of
the plurality’s opinion within the context of a discussion regarding the procedural
fairness of the punitive damages award.
165 Id.  at 454.  For a complete discussion of the differences between procedural
and substantive due process in punitive damages, see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK,
supra  note 12, at § 14.6(e).
166 As the Court recognized in Gore , defendants are entitled to notice of the se-
verity of the penalty that can be imposed.  Despite what some reviewing courts have
held, however, notice alone does not satisfy the factor three analysis.
167 See  Joseph E. Murphy, The Duty of the Government to Make the Law Known ,
51 FORDHAM L. REV. 255 (1982) (discussing the government’s constitutional obliga-
tion to make laws publicly known).
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infraction.  The latter argument is entirely distinct from the argu-
ment that the driver was unaware of the potential penalty.
Now assume the facts in the above hypothetical were slightly
different, and before the law imposing the $10,000 fine took ef-
fect, the state undertook a massive campaign of public service
announcements to alert drivers to the new law.  Under this sce-
nario, a driver who was fined under the new law would be unable
to argue that he or she lacked reasonable notice of the potential
penalty, but he or she could still argue that the $10,000 fine is
“grossly excessive” in relation to the state’s interest in protecting
its citizens on the highways.  As this example illustrates, a defen-
dant’s notice of a potential penalty does not trump potential con-
stitutional issues with regard to the amount of punishment that
may be imposed.  While the Excessive Fines Clause may apply to
bar states from imposing an extreme fine like the one in the hy-
pothetical, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence discussed above
indicates that the Due Process Clause imposes similar substan-
tive limits on civil punitive damages awards.
C. Courts That Have Given Due Meaning to the
Third Guidepost
Some courts have taken the U.S. Supreme Court’s Gore  deci-
sion seriously and have diligently applied all three factors set
forth by the Court to determine whether a punitive damages
award passes constitutional muster.  A notable example is the de-
cision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Exxon
Valdez ,168 in which the court reviewed the $5 billion punitive
damages verdict arising out of the Alaskan oil spill.  As in most
appellate reviews, the court examined the defendant’s conduct
and the ratio between the economic and punitive damages
awarded.  The Ninth Circuit then engaged in a thorough review
of the comparable civil and criminal penalties to the conduct at
issue, noting that the case was “unusually rich in
comparables.”169
The Ninth Circuit in Exxon Valdez  first compared the punitive
damages verdict to available criminal fines, stating that
“[c]riminal fines are particularly informative because punitive
damages are quasi-criminal.”170  The court found that the puni-
168 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001).
169 Id.  at 1245.
170 Id.
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tive damages award was 25,000 times one of the comparable
criminal fines, which was $200,000.171  The court also noted that
the limit on liability provided by Congress in the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Act is $100 million, 1/50 of the amount of punitive dam-
ages awarded by the jury in Exxon Valdez .172  In addition, the
Court referenced a plea agreement between Exxon and the At-
torneys General of the United States and the State of Alaska in
which Exxon agreed to pay $150 million in fines and restitu-
tion.173  Finally, after the oil spill, Congress enacted the Oil Pollu-
tion Act, which provides that owners of vessels can be subject to
a maximum fine of $3,000 per barrel for “gross negligence or
willful misconduct” resulting in discharged oil.174  That law did
not apply to Exxon’s conduct with respect to the Valdez incident
because it was passed after the oil spill.  Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit found that the Oil Pollution Act reflected Congress’s pol-
icy judgment as to an appropriate penalty in the precise situation
at hand.175  If the Act had applied, Exxon’s liability would not
have exceeded $786 million.176  Each of the civil fines that the
Ninth Circuit used as a basis for comparison indicated that $5
billion was a “grossly excessive” punitive damages award.177
Many cases will not be as “rich in comparables” as the Exxon
Valdez  litigation.178  Nevertheless, some courts have managed to
give meaning to the third Gore  factor, even where there were
fewer bases for comparison than in Exxon Valdez .  For instance,
in Watson v. Johnson Mobil Homes ,179 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that an award of $4,000 in compensatory damages
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.  at 1246.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 On remand, the district court issued an opinion that openly disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit and can only be characterized as defiant. See In re  the Exxon Valdez,
236 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Alaska 2002).  The trial court adhered to its view that the
$5 billion punitive damage award was not excessive.  The trial court, however, did
reduce the award to $4 billion in order to comply with what it viewed as the literal
terms of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate. See id.  at 1068.  In August 2003, the Ninth
Circuit once again vacated the damages award and sent it back to the lower court for
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in the State Farm  case. See
Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 03-35166 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003) (or-
der vacating and remanding damages award); Russell Gold, U.S. Court Rejects Puni-
tive Award for Exxon Spill , WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2003, at B2.
178 270 F.3d at 1245.
179 284 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2002).
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and $700,000 in punitive damages stemming from defendant’s al-
leged failure to return the plaintiff’s loan deposit on the purchase
of a mobile home was unconstitutionally excessive.180  With re-
spect to the third Gore  factor, in particular, the court noted that
Mississippi’s consumer protection laws provided for a compara-
ble civil penalty of up to $10,000 for each offense.181  Mississippi
law also provided that a first time offender may be subject to a
fine of between $1,000 and $5,000, and between one and five
years imprisonment.182  The court noted that although the statute
permitted “relatively severe” penalties for individuals who take
advantage of consumers, the single incident offense was small in
comparison to the punitive damages award in the Watson  case.183
Accordingly, the court remitted the punitive damages award to
$150,000.184
Furthermore, in Watkins v. Lundell ,185 involving claims for
breach of contract and fraud, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that a $3.5 million punitive damages award was un-
constitutionally excessive.186  In making that determination, the
court relied in part on the fact that the punitive damages award
was 350 times the civil sanction that could have been awarded
against the defendant for its conduct.187
IV
APPLYING THE THIRD GORE FACTOR IN
FUTURE CASES
As the previously discussed examples demonstrate, courts can
and should engage in a serious and faithful analysis of the third
Gore  factor.  Courts should not simply declare that there are no
similar or comparable fines and either end the analysis there or
move to a discussion of comparable jury verdicts in civil cases.  If
courts began to apply the third factor as required, litigants would
have an incentive to provide courts with information as to the
comparable or analogous fines in similar situations.  For example,
a court or litigant in a property damage case may look to criminal
180 Id.  at 573-74.
181 Id.  at 573.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.  at 574.
185 169 F.3d 540 (8th Cir. 1999).
186 Id.  at 545.
187 Id . at 546.
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fines for arson or theft.  Similarly, a court or litigant in a product
liability personal injury case may look to criminal fines for bat-
tery or, in appropriate cases, manslaughter.  The appendix to this
Article provides a sampling of state criminal fines and federal
civil and criminal fines as examples of penalties that could be
used by a court analyzing the comparable civil or criminal fines
required by Gore .188
Courts applying the third Gore  factor will in some cases need
to address situations in which the comparable criminal punish-
ment includes imprisonment.  Many courts have used the fact
that imprisonment may result from the conduct in question as a
carte blanche to permit juries to impose any amount of punitive
damages.189  Courts proceeding under this theory point to the Su-
preme Court’s statement in Haslip  that while the punitive dam-
ages were “much in excess” of the permissible fine,
“imprisonment . . . could also be required in a criminal con-
text.”190  Criminal imprisonment should not, however, be a rea-
son to give the jury free rein to award exorbitant punitive
damages.  As the Court stated in State Farm :  “Punitive damages
are not a substitute for the criminal process, and the remote pos-
sibility of a criminal sanction does not automatically sustain a pu-
nitive damages award.”191
In Haslip , the Court noted that the four-to-one ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages awards in that case was
“close to the line” of being unconstitutional, but the court ulti-
mately found that the punitive damages award was justified, pre-
sumably due in part to the fact that imprisonment was available
as an analogous criminal punishment.192  Thus, criminal impris-
onment was in essence a “thumb on the scale” in favor of a large
punitive damages award.  By way of comparison, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico has taken a balanced view of the issue,
holding that “the possibility of a jail sentence justifies a substan-
tial punitive damages award.”193  In Aken v. Plains Electric Gen-
188 See  Appendix.
189 See  Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 99 Cal. App. 4th 1115, 1151 (2002) (stating that
comparison to comparable civil and criminal fines only appropriate where the con-
duct in question cannot result in imprisonment, and is “inappropriate” if the conduct
could result in “substantial imprisonment”).
190 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991).
191 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1526 (2003).
192 499 U.S. at 23.
193 Aken v. Plains Elec. Gen. & Transmission Co-op., Inc., 49 P.3d 662, 671-72
(N.M. 2002).
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eral & Transmission Cooperative, Inc. , the court reviewed two
punitive damages awards given in the same case, one for wrong-
ful termination ($500,000 compensatory and $1.75 million puni-
tive damages), and another for libel ($100,000 compensatory and
$1 million punitive damages).194  With respect to the libel claim,
the court found that the defendant’s conduct had been suffi-
ciently reprehensible to support punitive damages.195  The court
then considered the ratio, and reduced the award in the libel
claim from a ratio of ten-to-one to three-to-one.196  The court
noted that criminal libel in New Mexico could be punished by a
$100 fine or up to one year imprisonment, or both.197  The court
found that the possibility of imprisonment justified a higher
award than the monetary statutory fine alone ($100) would jus-
tify.198  The New Mexico court’s judgment represents sound rea-
soning, because, as noted above, the court did not use the
possibility of imprisonment to justify a punitive damages award
that was ten times the compensatory damages award.  Rather,
the court reduced the award to three times the compensatory
damages awarded, and noted that the possibility of imprisonment
justified a higher award than the criminal monetary fine alone
might justify.  Therefore, the totality of the court’s opinion is that
imprisonment may justify a higher punitive damages award, but
the possibility of imprisonment does not justify a limitless award.
By taking the third Gore  factor seriously, and not allowing the
possibility of imprisonment to override all other concerns, the
New Mexico court met the U.S. Supreme Court’s call to appel-
late courts to use their particular expertise to give meaning to the
third Gore  factor.  Other courts would be wise to follow the ex-
ample set by the New Mexico Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, punitive damages
awards in this country have “run wild.”199  In response to
“skyrocketing”200 punitive damages awards, the Court has recog-
194 Id.
195 Id.  at 670.
196 Id.  at 671.
197 Id.  at 672.
198 Id.
199 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
200 Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282
(1989) (O’Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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nized that both substantive and procedural protections are guar-
anteed to defendants against whom punitive damages are
awarded.  In Gore , the Court held that punitive damages that are
“grossly excessive” are unconstitutional.  The Court also set forth
three “guideposts” that must be applied by lower courts to deter-
mine whether a punitive damages awards is unconstitutionally
excessive:  (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2)
the ratio between the actual damages and the punitive damages
award, and (3) the comparable civil and criminal sanctions for
the conduct.201  The importance of these factors was recently re-
inforced by the Court in State Farm .
Courts seem to have had relatively little difficulty applying the
first and second Gore  factors.  Applying the third Gore  factor,
however, has often been more difficult for courts.  Yet, as the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, appellate courts are
uniquely situated to apply the analysis required to give meaning
to the third Gore  factor.  Application of the third Gore  factor,
although a sometimes challenging task, is the only means by
which the courts can truly give the appropriate deference and
meaning to the Supreme Court’s punitive damages jurispru-
dence.  Rather than ignore or give short shrift to this factor,
courts should strive to follow the letter and spirit of the law.
201 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLES OF STATE CRIMINAL PENALTIES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Title and Section in Description Fine
the District of
Columbia Code
§ 22-404 Assault or Not more than $1,000 or imprisonment
threatened assault of not more than 180 days, or both.
in a menacing man-
ner
§ 22-712 Bribery Not more than $25,000 or three times
the monetary equivalent of the thing of
value, whichever is greater, or impris-
onment not to exceed ten years, or
both.
§ 22-2402 Perjury Not more than $5,000, or imprisonment
not to exceed ten years.
§ 22-3212 Penalties for theft Not more than $5,000 or imprisonment,
not more than ten years for first
degree; not more than $1,000 or impris-
onment not to exceed 180 days or both.
§ 22-3222 Penalties for fraud For first degree fraud—not more than
$5,000 or three times the value of the
property, whichever is greater, or
imprisonment for not more than ten
years, or both, if the value of the prop-
erty is $250 or more; not more than
$1,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
180 days or both, if the value of the
property is less than $250.  For second
degree fraud, not more than $3,000 or
three times the value of the property,
whichever is greater, or imprisonment
not to exceed three years, or both, if
the value of the property is $250 or
more; not more than $1,000 or impris-
onment not to exceed 180 days or both,
if the value of the property is less than
$250.
§ 22-3301 Unlawful entry on Not more than $100, or imprisonment
property not to exceed six months or both.
ILLINOIS
Title and Section in Description Fine
the Illinois Com-
piled Statutes Anno-
tated
§720  5/12-1 Assault Not to exceed $1,500, or imprisonment
not to exceed thirty days.
§720  5/12-3 Battery Not to exceed $2,500, or imprisonment
for any term less than one year.
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§720  5/16-1 Theft $2,500 or the amount specified in the
offense, whichever is greater, or impris-
onment for any term less than one year
if the property is not greater than $300;
$25,000 or twice the value of the prop-
erty, or imprisonment not less than five
years and not to exceed ten years if the
property is valued more than $300 and
less than $10,000.
§720  5/21-3 Criminal trespass to Not to exceed $1,500, or imprisonment
land not to exceed six months.
§720  5/32-2 Perjury Not to exceed $25,000 or the amount
specified in the offense, whichever is
greater, or imprisonment not less than
five years and not more than ten years.
§720  5/33-1 Bribery Not to exceed $25,000 or the amount
specified in the offense, whichever is
greater, or imprisonment not less than
seven years and not more than fourteen
years.
MARYLAND
Title and Section in Description Fine
the Annotated Code
of Maryland (1957)
Art. 27, § 12A Assault Imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five
years for first degree offense; not more
than $2,500 or imprisonment not to
exceed ten years or both for second
degree offense.
Art. 27, § 22 Offering bribe to or Not less than $100, not more than
receiving bribe by $5,000, or imprisonment not less than
public officer; wit- two years and not to exceed twelve
ness in prosecution years, or both.
Art. 27, § 35D Abuse or neglect of Not more than $5,000, or imprisonment
vulnerable persons not to exceed five years, or both.
Art. 27, § 36 Carrying or wearing Not more than $1,000, or imprisonment
concealed weapon; not to exceed three years.
carrying openly
with intent to
injure
Art. 27, § 173 Fraud—Conversion Not more than $5,000, or imprisonment
of partnership not to exceed ten years, or both.
money
Art. 27, § 209 Fraud—Receiving Not more than $500, or imprisonment
premiums after not to exceed six months, or both.
insolvency
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Art. 27, § 342 Theft A value of $300 or greater shall restore
property to owner or pay the value of
the property or services and be fined
not more than $1,000, or imprisonment
not to exceed fifteen years, or both; a
value of less than $300 shall restore
property to owner or pay him the value
of the property or services and be fined
not more than $500, or imprisonment
not to exceed eighteen months.
Art. 27, § 439 Perjury Incarceration only not to exceed ten
years.
Art. 27, § 576 Trespass on posted Not exceeding $500, or imprisonment
property not to exceed three months.
MICHIGAN
Title and Section in Description Fine
Michigan Compiled
Laws Service
Penal Code Assault without Not more than $500, or imprisonment
§ 750.81a weapon and inflic- not to exceed ninety-three days, or
tion of serious both.
injury without cer-
tain intent
Penal Code Bribe Not more than $5,000, or imprisonment
§ 750.118 not to exceed ten years.
Penal Code Embezzlement Not more than $500 or three times the
§ 750.174 value of the money or property embez-
zled, whichever is greater, or imprison-
ment not to exceed ninety-three days,
or both if valued at $200 or less; not
more than $2,000 or three times the
value of the money or property embez-
zled, whichever is greater, or imprison-
ment not to exceed one year, or both if
the property embezzled has a value of
$200 or more but less than $1,000.
Penal Code Larceny Not more than $500 or three times the
§ 750.356 value of the property stolen, whichever
is greater, or imprisonment not to
exceed ninety days, or both if the prop-
erty stolen has a value less than $200;
not more than $2,000 or three times the
value of the property stolen, whichever
is greater, or imprisonment not to
exceed one year, or both if property
stolen has a value of $200 but less than
$1,000.
Penal Code Larceny by conver- †
§ 750.362 sion or embezzle-
ment
† Penal Code § 750.503 provides that the punishment for a felony, when not fixed
by statute, is not more than $2,000, or imprisonment not to exceed four years, or
both.  Mich. Penal Code § 750.504 also provides that the punishment for a misde-
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Penal Code Perjury committed Incarceration only not to exceed more
§ 750.422 in courts than fifteen years.
Penal Code Willful trespass Not more than $100, or imprisonment
§§750.546 and not to exceed ninety days.†
750.547
Penal Code Wage discrimina- Not more than $100, or imprisonment
§ 750.556 tion not to exceed ninety days.†
NEW YORK
Title and Section in Description Fine*
New York Consoli-
dated Laws
Penal Law § 120.00 Assault in the third Not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment
degree not to exceed one year.
Penal Law § 120.05 Assault in the sec- Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
ond degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least two years and
not to exceed seven years.
Penal Law § 120.10 Assault in the first Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least five years and
not to exceed twenty-five years.
Penal Law § 140.10 Criminal trespass in Not exceeding $500, or imprisonment
the third degree not to exceed three months.
Penal Law § 140.15 Criminal trespass in Not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment
the second degree not to exceed one year.
Penal Law § 140.17 Criminal trespass in Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
the first degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least two years and
not to exceed seven years.
Penal Law § 155.25 Petit Larceny Not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment
not to exceed one year.
Penal Law § 155.40 Grand Larceny in Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
the second degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least 31/2 years and
not to exceed fifteen years.
Penal Law § 155.42 Grand Larceny in Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
the first degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least five years and
not to exceed twenty-five years.
Penal Law § 170.15 Forgery in the first Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least 31/2 years and
not to exceed fifteen years.
meanor, when not fixed by statute, is not more than $100, or imprisonment not to
exceed ninety days, or both.
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Penal Law § 185.05 Fraud involving a Not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment
security interest not to exceed one year.
Penal Law § 190.05 Issuing a bad check Not exceeding $500, or imprisonment
not to exceed three months.
Penal Law § 200.00 Bribery in the Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
thirddegree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least two years and
not to exceed seven years.
Penal Law § 200.03 Bribery in the sec- Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
ond degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least 31/2 years and
not to exceed fifteen years.
Penal Law § 200.04 Bribery in the first Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least five years and
not to exceed twenty-five years.
Penal Law § 210.05 Perjury in the third Not exceeding $1,000, or imprisonment
degree not to exceed one year.
Penal Law § 210.10 Perjury in the sec- Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
ond degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least 11/2 years and
not to exceed four years.
Penal Law § 210.15 Perjury in the first Not exceeding the higher of $5,000, or
degree double the amount of defendant’s gain
from commission of the crime, or
imprisonment of at least two years and
not to exceed seven years.
TEXAS
Title and Section in Description Fine*
Vernon’s Texas
Codes Annotated
Penal Code § 22.01 Assault If a third degree felony, imprisonment
not to exceed ten years or less than two
years, and may also be fined not to
exceed $10,000; if a Class A misde-
meanor, not to exceed $4,000, or
imprisonment not to exceed one year,
or both; if a Class C misdemeanor, not
to exceed $500.
Penal Code § 30.05 Criminal Trespass Not to exceed $4,000, or imprisonment
not to exceed one year.
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Penal Code § 31.03 Theft (includes Not to exceed $500 if value of property
embezzlement) stolen is less than $50; if value of prop-
erty stolen is $50 or more but less than
$500, not to exceed $2,000, or imprison-
ment not to exceed 180 days, or both; if
value of property stolen is $500 or
more but less than $1,500, not to
exceed $4,000, or imprisonment not to
exceed one year, or both; imprisonment
not to exceed two years or not less
than 180 days, and may be fined not to
exceed $10,000 if value of property sto-
len is at least $1,500 but less than
$20,000.
Penal Code § 32.21 Forgery Not to exceed $10,000, or imprisonment
not more than two years or less than
180 days.
Penal Code § 32.41 Issuance of Bad Not to exceed $500.
Check
Penal Code § 32.45 Misapplication of Not to exceed $500 if value of property
Fiduciary Property is less than $20; not to exceed $2,000,
or imprisonment not to exceed 180
days, or both if value of property is $20
or more but less than $500; not to
exceed $4,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed one year, or both if value of
property is $500 or more but less than
$1,500; imprisonment not more than
two years or less than 180 days, and
may be fined not to exceed $10,000 if
value of property is $1,500 or more but
less than $20,000.
Penal Code § 36.02 Bribery Imprisonment not to exceed twenty
years or less than two years, and may
be fined not to exceed $10,000.
Penal Code § 37.02 Perjury Not to exceed $4,000, or imprisonment
not to exceed one year, or both.
VIRGINIA
Title and Section in Description Fine*
the Code of Vir-
ginia
§ 18.2-95 Grand larceny Not more than $2,500, or imprisonment
(includes embezzle- not to exceed twelve months, or both.
ment)
§ 18.2-96 Petit larceny Not more than $2,500, or imprisonment
not to exceed twelve months, or both.
§ 18.2-119 Trespass Not more than $2,500, or imprisonment
not to exceed twelve months, or both.
* If the defendant is not a natural person, the court shall impose only a fine, Va.
Code § 18.2-10(g).
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§ 18.2-181 Issuing bad checks Not more than $2,500, or imprisonment
not to exceed twelve months, or if the
value is less than $200; not more than
$2,500, or imprisonment not to exceed
five years and not less than twelve
months or both, if the value is $200 or
more.
§ 18.2-204 False statement for Not more than $500.
the purpose of
defrauding indus-
trial sick benefit
company
§ 18.2-434 Perjury Not more than $2,500, or imprisonment
for not less than twelve months and not
more than ten years, or both.
§ 18.2-449 Bribery Not more than $100,000 and imprison-
ment not less than two years nor more
than ten years.
WEST VIRGINIA
Title and Section in Description Fine
the West Virginia
Code
§ 61-2-9 Malicious or unlaw- Not exceeding $500, and imprisonment
ful assault; battery not to exceed twelve months, or impris-
onment only not less than one nor
more than five years.
§ 61-3-12 Entry of building Not exceeding $100, and imprisonment
other than dwelling not less than two nor more than twelve
months.
§ 61-3-13 Grand and petit Not exceeding $2,500, and imprison-
larceny ment not more than one year, or
imprisonment only not less than one
year nor more than ten years.
§ 61-3-24 Obtaining money, Not more than $2,500 and imprison-
property and ser- ment not more than one year, or
vices by false pre- imprisonment only not less than one
tenses year nor more than ten years, if value
of the goods is $1,000 or more.
§ 61-3-24a Obtaining or Not more than $2,500 and imprison-
attempting to ment not more than one year, or
obtain goods, prop- imprisonment only not less than one
erty or service by year nor more than ten years, if value
false or fraudulent of the goods is $1,000 or more; if less
use of credit cards than $1,000 in value, not more than
or other false or $2,500, or imprisonment not more than
fraudulent means one year.
§ 61-3-38 Publication of false Not more than $100 and not less than
advertisements $10.
§ 61-3-39a Making, issuing Not more than $200; on third or subse-
worthless check quent conviction, not more than $200,
or imprisonment not more than ten
days, or both.
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§ 61-3B-2 Trespass in struc- Not more than $100; if armed with a
ture or conveyance dangerous weapon with the intent to do
bodily injury, not less than $100 nor
more than $500, or imprisonment not
more than twelve months, or both.
§ 61-3C-4 Computer fraud Not more than $10,000, or imprison-
ment not more than ten years, or both.
§ 61-5-3 Perjury Not more than $1,000, or imprisonment
not more than one year.
§ 61-5-7 Bribery Not more than $5,000, and imprison-
ment not less than one year nor more
than ten years.
§ 61-3-37 Publication of false Not more than $1,000, or imprisonment
statement as to not more than one year, or both.
financial condition
of person, firm or
corporation
EXAMPLES OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL PENALTIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Title and Section in Description Fine
the United States
Code*
18 U.S.C. § 2A2.3 Minor Assault Minimum of $500 and maximum of
$5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 2A2.2 Aggravated Assault Minimum of $4,000 and maximum of
$40,000.
18 U.S.C. § 2A2.1 Assault with the Minimum of $12,500 and maximum of
intent to murder $125,000.
18 U.S.C. § 2B1.1 Theft, Embezzle- Minimum of $500 and maximum of
ment, Receipt of $5,000 if the loss in less than $5,000;
Stolen Property minimum of $17,500 and maximum of
$175,000 if the loss is more than $1 mil-
lion.
18 U.S.C. § 2B2.3 Trespass Minimum of $250 and maximum of
$5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 2B3.1 Robbery, Extortion, Minimum of $75,000 and maximum of
Blackmail $150,000 if the loss is more than $5 mil-
lion.
18 U.S.C. § 2C1.1 Offering, Giving, Minimum of $2,000 and maximum of
Soliciting, or $20,000.
Receiving A Bribe
18 U.S.C. § 2G2.2 Sexual Exploitation Minimum of $5,000 and maximum of
of Minors $50,000; minimum of $10,000 and maxi-
mum of $100,000 if done for pecuniary
gain.
18 U.S.C. § 2M1.1 Treason Minimum of $25,000 and maximum of
$250,000 if tantamount to waging war.
18 U.S.C. § 2N1.1 Tampering with Minimum of $10,000 and maximum of
Consumer Products $100,000.
* The fines for individual defendants are found in 18 U.S.C. § 5E1.2.
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18 U.S.C. § 2N2.1 Violations of Stat- Minimum of $500 and maximum of
utes and Regula- $5,000.
tions Dealing with
Any Food, Drug,
Biological Product,
Device, Cosmetics,
or Agricultural
Product
18 U.S.C. § 2Q1.1 Knowingly Endan- Minimum of $10,000 and maximum of
germent Resulting $100,000.
From Mishandling
of Hazardous or
Toxic Substances,
Pesticides or Other
Pollutants
18 U.S.C. § 2Q1.2 Mishandling of Minimum of $1,000 and maximum of
Hazardous or Toxic $10,000.
Substances or Pesti-
cides; Record keep-
ing, Tampering and
Falsification;
Unlawfully Trans-
porting Hazardous
Materials in Com-
merce
EXAMPLES OF CIVIL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF CERTAIN FEDERAL REGULATIONS
PROVIDED FOR BY STATUTE
Federal Statute Description Fine
Federal Food, Drug Adulteration or Not more than $1,000 or imprisonment
and Cosmetic Act misbranding of any for not more than one year, or both;
21 U.S.C. § 301 et food, drug, device, not more than $10,000 or imprisonment
seq.* or cosmetic in for not more than three years, or both
interstate com- for the second violation or if with the
merce intent to defraud or mislead.
21 U.S.C. § 331(t) Prescription drug Not more than $250,000 or imprison-
marketing viola- ment not more than ten years, or both.
tions Any manufacturer or distributor that
distributes drug samples by means of
mail or common carrier, and sells,
trades, or offers to sell such samples
shall be fined not more than $50,000
for each of the first two violations
resulting in a conviction of any repre-
sentative of the manufacturer or distrib-
utor in any ten-year period, or fined
not more than $1 million for each vio-
lation resulting in a conviction of any
representative after the second convic-
tion in any ten-year period.
* Prohibited acts of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act are found in 21
U.S.C. §§ 331(a)-(z), and penalties for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331 can be found in
21 U.S.C. § 333.
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21 U.S.C. § 333(f) Misbranding or If any person violates § 331 as it relates
removal or altera- to devices, a civil penalty not to exceed
tion of any mark or $15,000 for each violation, and not to
label required to Exceed $1 million for all such viola-
identify a device** tions in a single proceeding.
21 U.S.C. Introduction into Not more than $50,000 in the case of
§ 342(a)(2)(b) interstate com- an individual, and $250,000 in the case
merce adulterated of any other person for such introduc-
food that bears or tion or delivery, not to exceed $500,000
contains unsafe pes- for all such violations adjudicated in a
ticide chemical resi- single proceeding.
due
Toxic Substance Violations of 40 $27,500 per violation per day.
Control Act of C.F.R. Parts 700-
1976 766 (use of chemi-
cal substances;
import and export
of chemical sub-
stances; lead-based
paint poisoning pre-
vention; and con-
tainment of
asbestos materials
in schools)
Resource Conserva- Violations of 40 $27,500 per violation per day.
tion Recovery Act C.F.R. Parts 261-
of 1976 (which 299 (management
amends the Solid and disposal of haz-
Waste Disposal Act ardous waste),
of 1965, 42 U.S.C. Parts 239-257 (man-
§ 321 et seq .) agement and dispo-
sal of solid waste),
Parts 280-282 (man-
agement and dispo-
sal of underground
storage tanks), and
Part 259 (manage-
ment and disposal
of medical waste)
Clean Air Act of Violations of 40 $27,500 per violation per day or per
1970 as amended, C.F.R. Parts 50-59 motor vehicle/engine; violations of the
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et (ambient air quality tampering requirements by a person
seq . (1990) standards, including other than the dealer or company, or
filtration and emis- defeat device provisions by anyone may
sions standards) incur penalties up to $2,750 per vehicle
or engine.
** A device generally means a medical device such as an instrument, apparatus,
implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or re-
lated article which is intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions,
or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man, or other ani-
mals; or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals.
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Clean Water Act, Violations of 40 Up to $27,500 per violation per day.*
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et C.F.R. Parts 112- Class I penalties are fined up to $10,000
seq . (1977) 113, 116-117, 122- per violation not to exceed $25,000.
125 and 129-133 Class II penalties are fined up to
(water programs, $10,000 per day per violation not to
i.e ., oil pollution exceed $125,000.**
prevention, water
quality planning
and management
and water quality
standards), Parts
230-233 (disposal
sites standards for
dredged or fill
materials), Parts
405-471 (effluent
guidelines and stan-
dards for agricul-
tural mills to
prevent water con-
tamination) and
Parts 501 and 503
(use and disposal of
sewage sludge to
prevent water con-
tamination)
Safe Drinking Violations of 40 Not to exceed $25,000 per day; tamper-
Water Act, 42 C.F.R. Parts 141- ing with a public water system carries a
U.S.C. § 300 (f) et 149 (national pri- maximum civil penalty of $50,000; a
seq . (1974) mary and secondary maximum civil penalty of $20,000 can
drinking water stan- be imposed for an attempt or threat to
dards to prevent tamper with a public water system.
above ground water
contamination;
underground injec-
tion control stan-
dards to prevent
below ground con-
tamination)
National Traffic and Violations of 49 A person who manufactures, sells or
Motor Vehicle C.F.R. Parts 529- imports noncomplying motor vehicles
Safety Act of 1966, 596 (defective auto- and equipment is liable for a civil pen-
as amended 49 mobile parts and alty of not more than $5,000 for each
U.S.C. § 30101 et substandard design) violation.  A separate violation occurs
seq . for each motor vehicle or item of
motor vehicle equipment and for each
failure or refusal to allow or perform
an act required by any of those sec-
tions.  The maximum civil penalty is
$15 million.
* Section 309 of the Clean Water Act.
** Section 311 of the Clean Water Act.
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